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I. INTRODUCTION 
The  purpose of this note is to suggest the feasibility in certain com-  
munication-through-noise situations of applying a maximin or minimax 
type decision criterion to ~he design of the receiver, to illustrate this 
decision criterion in two rather straightforward examples involving 
binary data links, and to look at the information rate which can be 
achieved. We are concerned here with the receiver decision problem when 
the signal is corrupted only by additive noise and when the additive 
noise has no statistical regularity or predictability of which advantage 
can be taken. Thus the "noise" may be natural or man-made and sub- 
jeer to influences unknown to the communicators. Essentially the only 
restriction on the noise is that its power be bounded. 
The point of departure here is to use a decision criterion at the receiver 
which guarantees the greatest possible average reliability of reception, 
no matter what the noise is doing. This leads to a maximim decision 
criterion at the receiver and to the use of concepts from the theory of 
constant-sum, two-person game theory. We review briefly some of these 
concepts in Section II. The examples are carried out in Sections I I I  and 
IV. One urould expect hat a receiver designed to work as well as possible 
against any kind of noise would not work especially well against any 
particular kind (say white Gaussian noise), and that there will be a 
resulting decrease in information rate from that achieved in systems 
where the noise is specified statistically. We calculate the information 
rate for the examples considered in Section V. 
II. GAME THEOP~Y TERMINOLOGY ~ 
We shall be concerned with a special class of zero-sum, two-person 
games G in normal form, which may be described as follows: There are 
* Operated with support from the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
This section consists of a very brief review of the terminology and facts from 
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two players, to be denoted by I and I I ;  player I has a set of possible 
strategies B, player I I  has a set of possible strategies A ; ~ and ~ will be 
generic elements of B and A, respectively, so ¢~ will denote a strategy of 
I, a a strategy of II. To avoid later confusion, these strategies will be 
called pure strategies. There is also a yayoff unction (or matrix), P (B, a), 
which is a real valued function of ~ and a. A single play of the game G 
consists of the following: player I chooses a pure strategy fi, unknown to 
player I I ;  player I I  chooses a pure strategy a, unknown to player I; the 
value of the payoff function P(a ,  fl) is determined for this pair a, fi, and 
player I I  pays player I the amount P(a,  ~). I t  is to player II 's advantage 
to keep the payoff as small as possible, to player I's advantage to make 
the payoff as large as possible. 
With the exception of one simple result, we shall confine ourselves 
entirely to eases in which B and A are either finite sets or are closed, 
finite intervals of the real line; thus, ¢~ and a will be real numbers bounded 
from above and below. 
We now want to consider the mixed extension, F  of G. A mixed 
strategy (heneeforth, just, strategy) for player I is a probability distribu- 
tion F(~) on B; similarly a mixed strategy (stategy) for player I I  is a 
probability distribution H(a) on A. We may consider heuristically an 
extended play of the game G, or a play of F, to consist of the following: 
I has a random number generator which generates numbers fl according 
to the distribution F(~), I I  similarly can generate random numbers 
according to H(a) .  A long sequence of independent random numbers 
{¢~/ is obtained from player I's random number generator and a corre- 
sponding sequence of independent random numbers {all is obtained 
from player II 's random number generator. Then a sequence of single 
plays of the game G is made with I successively using the pure strategies 
~ and I I  using a~. The final payoff is taken to be the average of the 
single game payoffs; that is, the payoff of the extended game P is defined 
to be 
~ ~ P(,,oO dF($) dH(c~). 
If either B or A is a finite or denumerable s t, the corresponding integral 
may be replaced by a sum. 
game theory which we need. Definitions for the most part are stated loosely. For 
precise statements and a general treatment ofthe theory, the reader is referred to 
Blackwell and Girshick, 1954. 
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The lower value of G, v, ,  is the least upper bound of the payoffs that 
I van guarantee himself in the extended game F by properly choosing a 
strategy F(/~), no matter what strategy H(a) I I  employs. That  is 
v,----l'u'b'{~{~'fAJBP(~'~)dF(~)dZ-I(~)}'F(v, 
The upper value v* is 
[lab } 
I t  is easy to show that always 
V, =_~ V*. 
If v, = v*, the game is said to have a vague v = v , ,  I f  there is a strategy 
Fo(5) such that 
v, = I I o~) dFo(5) dH(o~) 
JA 
then F0(5) is called a mazimin strategy. There is a corresponding defini- 
tion for minimax strategy. If  we ally ourselves with player I, then we 
are interested in finding maximin strategies, or at least strategies which 
guarantee a payoff dose to v , .  The fundamental theorem of zero-sum, 
two-person games is that every finite game (both B and A finite sets) 
has a value and there exist maximin and minimax strategies for I and I [  
respectively. There are various extensions of this theorem to infinite 
games, but we shall not need to use them explicitly. 
A simple remark, but one which we shall use, is: if there exists a mixed 
strategy H0(~) for player I I  with the property that 
P(B, a) dHo(~) lc for all < 
then v,  < /c. This follows directly from the definition of v , .  
Often there are redundant or duplicate pure strategies in games and 
nothing essential is changed if these are eliminated. We say G' and G" 
are equivalent games if 
1. by an elimination of duplicated pure strategies for I in G', G' 
becomes identical with G", or 
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2. by an elimination of duplicated pure strategies for I I  in G', G' 
becomes identical with G I', or 
3. there is a finite sequence of games G' = G1, G2, . . -  , GN = G" 
such that G, and G,+I are related as in 1 or 2. 
Equivalent games  have the same upper  and lower values. 
Two further remarks are needed. If in a game G a new game G' is 
fo rmed by  deleting some of I's pure strategies, the lower value v,' of G' 
is less than or equal to v,. This is essentially obvious, for I certainly 
cannot guarantee himself a larger payoff if he loses some of his possible 
strategies. However, if a pure strategy f12 has the property that there is 
a fl~ such that 
P (~,  a) < g(~,  ,*) 
for every a, then I can delete the strategy ¢~2 without decreasing the lower 
value of the game. Obvious parallel remarks may be made concerning 
the deletion of pure strategies of player II. 
III. KEYED CARI%IER SYSTEM WITH POWER DETECTOR 
A. SYSTEM MODEL 
As  a first example  let us consider perhaps the simplest kind of binary 
data link, a synchronously-keyed carrier, in which the MARK symbol  
is transmitted as unmodu la ted  carrier for an interval of duration T 
and the SPACE symbol  is "transmitted" as an interval of silence of 
duration T. The  system is only synchronous with respect to the modu-  
lation; either the receiver has a clock which  indicates approximately the 
beginning and end of each symbol  period, or a synchronizing signal is 
sent. In any  event rf phase is not necessarily known.  We assume the 
signal level at the receiver is known,  so we may represent the signals at 
the receiver by  
MARK: s(t)  = b cos(o~o t q- 0) 1t 0 < t < T 
SPACE: s(t) 0 J 
where 0 is unknown and where b is chosen so that 
fo r b 2 cos 2 dt 1. O5O t 
It  is further assumed T is sutIiciently greater than 1/co0 so that to a very 
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good approximation 
fo ~ b 2 cos2(~0 t O) dt 1 + 
for all 0. Since in this example rf phase is disregarded and the modulation 
is a simple on or off, the receiver can recover all the information there is 
in the signal by just measuring the energy received uring each symbol 
interval. Accordingly, we shall suppose that the basic signal-processing 
done by the receiver esults in a measurement of energy in a hand of 
arbitrary width about the carrier frequency f0 • The channel disturbance 
is assumed to be additive, so that the total received wave form, y(t),  
can be written 
y(t) = s(t) -~ z(t), 0 <= t < T 
where z(t) is the disturbing signal or noise. We shall refer to z(t) as 
"noise," but there is no implication that it has any of the properties 
usually associated with noise, such as being Gaussian, stationary, or 
even random in any sense. In fact, the only restrictions on z(t) are 
that it be energy limited, 
T 
o z~(t) dt =< a = constant 
and that it be uncorrelated with s(t) over the interval 0 <_- t < T, 
T 
o s(t) z(t) dt = O. 
This second restriction simplifies the decision problem at the receiver 
a little when, as in the present case, the receiver is not sensitive to rf 
phase. It  seems a perfectly reasonable restriction in view of the fact the 
symbol interval is long compared to one rf period. 
Thus the output at the end of each symbol interval from what may be 
ealled the signal-processing part of the receiver--the part which we have 
fixed in the above discussion and which does not involve any decision 
making--is: 
T 
= 1 + fo z2(t) dt if MARX was sent Y 
T 
= [ z2(t) dt if SPACE was sent. 
Jo 
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If we let a be the energy in the noise, 
T 
= fo z2(t) dr, 
then the output is either 1 + a or a, where 0 =< a =< a, a being the 
maximum permissible noise-to-signal ratio. 
The decision problem to be solved is to state a decision rule which 
will tell from the value y whether a MARK was sent or a SPACE was 
sent. Obviously, if the noise energy a during each symbol is known, the 
correct decision can always be made. However, if a is unknown and 
varies from symbol to symbol and a > 1, the decision problem is non- 
trivial. Let us re-emphasize that nothing is known about the noise which 
would permit assigning a probability distribution to a, so a Bayes' 
solution is out of the question. Instead, we shall specify a decision rule, 
which amounts, of course, to specifying a decision-making receiver, 
which we prove to be nearly optimum in a game-theoretic sense, now to 
be made precise. 
B. GAME THEORETIC  FORMULATION 
We now use the concepts reviewed in Section I[. Let the opponents  in 
a two-person game be the person who is receiving the communicat ion,  
who will be called player I, and  Nature, who will be called player II. 
One  play of the game will consist first of the choice with probability 
one-half of either a MARK or SPACE,  unknown to both players, then 
the transmission of that symbo l  with accompany ing  noise introduced by  
player II, and then the decision at the receiver by  player I as to whether  
a MARK or SPACE was  transmitted. A pure strategy for player I is a 
decision rule which  assigns to each output y either MARK or SPACE;  
we may represent MARK by  1 and SPACE by  0, so a pure strategy for 
player I is a zero-or-one-valued function of y. A mixed  strategy for I 
is a randomized  decision rule and  can be represented by  a function of y 
taking on values anywhere  between zero and one, its value being the 
probability a MARK will be announced.  A pure strategy for player II 
is a choice of a, that is, a choice of the energy of the noise in the accept- 
ance band of ~he receiver. A mixed  strategy for II is a probability dis- 
tribution of values of a between 0 and a. We shall take as the value of the 
payoff function the probability that the decision made by  player I is 
correct. In a sense, then, player I I  pays player I; it is to player I's 
advantage for the payoff to be as large as possible. This choice of payoff 
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function is of course arbitrary, but seems quite reasonable in view of the 
symmetric binary nature of the transmission. The payoff function will 
be denoted by P(% a) where the variable ~, corresponds to the pure 
strategies of I, and a to the pure strategies of II. 
From what has been said above, it is clear that player II's pure strate- 
gies can be indexed by or made to correspond to the real numbers a in 
the interval 0 =< c~ =< a. Player I's pure strategies on the other hand 
correspond to subsets of the interval [0, a -t- I]; in fact, any nonrandom- 
ized decision rule amounts to a specification of the set of possible values 
of y for which a MARK will be announced. There are too many subsets 
of an interval to be indexed by the numbers in the interval, so we cannot 
represent all of player I's pure strategies by real numbers in a finite 
interval. We could if necessary represent a qu~te large class of I's pure 
strategies by points in an interval--a class large enough to include any 
nonrandomized decision rule that might reasonably be implemented-- 
by using standard mappings that carry n-dimensional nd even m-di- 
mensional spaces onto the line. This is not necessary, however, because 
we need to consider player I's full set of pure strategies only superficially 
in order to establish a simple upper bound on the payoff of which player 
I can be sure. For the rest of the discussion we are then able to restrict 
player I's strategies to a simple subclass which corresponds in a natural 
way to the points on a finite interval. We then have a two-person game 
in the form discussed in Section II. 
C. AN UPPER BOIYND ON PLAYER I'S GUAtlnNTEED PAYOI~F 
As mentioned in Section II, the largest payoff player I can guarantee 
himself, that is, the maximum probability of making a correct decision 
which the communicator can guarantee himself, is the lower value, 
v , ,  of the game. For the game being discussed we have 
1 1 
v. =<~+ 2-a" 
The proof is as follows: Let d~(y) be any nonrandomized decision func- 
tion. Then if player II uses the pure strategy a and the symbol sent is 
MARK, the payoff is d~(a -t- 1), which is either zero or one. If the 
symbol sent is SPACE, the payoff is 1 - dr(a). Since the two possible 
symbols are sent each with probability one-half, the payoff function is 
p(~, a) = d~(~ + 1) + (1 - d~(~)) 
9 
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Hence, if I I  weights his pure strategies uniformly, 
a a 
a + 3) + (1 - 
for all ~ and assuming a > 1. The conclusion follows from a remark in 
Section II. 
D. A NEAR-OPTIMUM DECISION RULE 
We shall now exhibit a rather simple mixed strategy for player I 
which guarantees a payoff that nearly realizes the upper bound on v, 
just obtained, in particular, which guarantees a payoff equal to 1/2 3- 
1/2[a q- 1]. 2 This strategy, incidentally, is demonstrated to be a maximin 
strategy for player II with respect o a smaller but reasonable class of 
pure strategies. Some comment is required here. We do not show whether 
the original game has a value or not, or whether the estimate of 1/2 3- 
1/2a on the lower value is attained or attained to within arbitrary e. 
Thus, in a mathematical sense we do not solve the game; however, the 
guaranteed payoff using this strategy is certainly close enough to the 
best possible to warrant its use in calculations about the channel. 
First we replace the game G by a simpler game G t in which player I I  
has the same set of strategies available but player I has a reduced set. 
l l • ! Denote thelowervalueof G by v, ; as pointed out in Section II, v, _<- v , .  
In G' we allow player I precisely those pure strategies which correspond 
to setting a single threshold fl and deciding SPACE if y < fi, MARK 
if y >- ft. Thus, player I's pure strategies may be indexed by the real 
numbers ]3, 0 <_- fl _-< a 3- 1 since the output y lies between 0 and a 3- 1. 
Furthermore, since the pure strategy fl = 1 is uniformly better than any 
pure strategy fl < 1, we can restrict fl to lie in the interval 1 =< ~ =< 
a 3- 1. Thus, the game G' has a payoff function P(fl, a) which is defined 
on a rectangle in the plane. By enumerating the possibilities one sees 
easily that 
P (~,a)  = } i f  0-<_ a <~-  1 
= l i f  fl-- I <=aKf l  
=}i f  ~<= a<= a. 
The payoff function is shown by the graph given in Fig. 1. 
Ix] denotes the largest integer less than or equal to x. 
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We shall show that  G' has a value v' = 1/2 -t- 1/2[a + 1]. First, sup- 
pose player I 's  pure strategies are limited to the finite set, ~ = 1, ~ = 2, 
• -- , ~ = [a -/- 1]. Call the resulting game G". Then one observes that  
player I I ' s  pure strategies in G" are reduced to a finite number of equiva- 
lence classes; all pure strategies n < a =< n -}- 1, for fixed n, n = 0, 
1,  • • • , [a], are equivalent. Thus, G" is equivalent o a finite game whose 
payoff is a square, finite matrix with [a + 1] X [a + I] entries, ones on a 
diagonal and one-halves off the diagonal, as shown in Fig. 2. Since G" is 
equivalent o this finite game it has a value, which is easily seen to be 
v" k --  1 1 1 1 1 
= ~ ,~+~--~+2-~ 
where k = [a + 11. Then, 
V* r :> Vp I 1 1 
= = ~ + 2[a + 1]" 
A maximin strategy for player I in G" is to choose each pure strategy 
randomly with probabil ity 1 /L  
Next, suppose player I I ' s  pure strategies in G' are limited to the 
finite set a = 0, a = 1, . . .  , a = [a]. Call the resulting game G". Then 
player I 's  pure strategies in G"  are reduced to a finite number of equiva- 
lence classes; fl = 1 forms one class by itself; all pure strategies n < ~ =< 
n -t- 1 for fixed n, n = 1, 2, . . -  , [a + 1], are equivalent. Thus, G"  is 
equivalent o the same finite game as G", i.e., G" is equivalent o G". 
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Since G "p was formed from G' by deleting some of player II 's strategies, 
we have 
V,' ~ V" 1 1 
- -  --- 2 -[- 2[a q-  1] 
where v*' is the upper value of G' and v" is the value of G". Thus, 
1 1 
v', = v*' = v' =~- f -2 [a_~ 1]" 
We have shown that game G' has tile value 1/2 + 1/2[a + 1] and that 
a good mixed strategy for player I in G' is that which weights evenly the 
strategies fl = 1, 2, . . .  , [a + 1]. Since in passing from G' to G, player 
II 's strategies are left unchanged, this same mixed strategy for player I
will guarantee the same payoff in G. In terms of the communication 
problem the communicators can, then, by using the random decision 
rule just specified, guarantee themselves a per symbol probability of 
being correct of 1/2 + 1/2[a + 1], where a is the noise-to-signal ratio. 
This formula is trivially valid for a < 1. One should notice that a bad 
feature of the max-min strategy is that, although the probability of 
being correct cannot fall below the value stated, it cannot rise above it 
either, no matter what the nature of the noise, so long as the potential 
noise-to-signal ratio is a. In practice, the communicators might not 
know a. They would then be forced to estimate a value for a; if they 
estimate a too large, they can guarantee a probability of being correct of 
greater than ½, but the probability is lower than need be. 
IV. PHASE REVERSAL MODULATION WITH 
CORRELATION DETECTION 
A.  SYSTEM MODEL 
Again we consider a binary data link, this time one in which rf phase 
must be known at the receiver. As before, we assume the signal level at 
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MARK : 
SPACE : 
where 
the receiver is known, but we allow the MARK signal to be any wave- 
form at all. The SPACE signal is its negative. Thus, with the normaliza- 
tion imposed, the signals are 
= f ( t ) )  
_ f ( t )~ 0 < t < T 
8(t) 
T 
o f2(t) dt = 1. 
The signal at the receiver terminals is 
y(t) --~ s(t) + z(t), 0 <= t < T 
where the noise z(t) is any waveforin whatever subject o the restriction 
T 
o z~(t) dt <= a. 
We postulate 3 that the basic detector is a eorrelator which computes 
T 
= Jo f ( t )y( t )  dt. Y 
It is desired to find a decision rule which will tell from the value y whether 
a MARK or SPACE was sent. 
B. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION 
The two-person game is set up essentially as before with the payoff 
again the probability of being correct on each decision. Since any two 
noise waveforms which have the same inner product with f (t)  must 
produce exactly the same effect, a pure strategy of player I I  (Nature) 
can be indexed by a real number ~, 
T ya  
= Jo f(t)z(t)  dt O! 
where -- %/~ =< ~ < V~.  Player I's strategies are as before. 
3 By being more precise about formulating the model, one can prove in this con- 
text that a correlation detector provides as good pre-decision data processing as 
possible. 
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Again, we can obtain a simple upper bound on the payoff player I
can guarantee himself. In fact 
P(T, a) = d,(a + 1) + 1 - d,(a - 1) 
2 
Hence, if II weights his strategies uniformly, 
f 1 1 va P(% a) da =< ~ + 2v/--- ~
for all % from which it follows that 
1 1 
v, _-< ~ + 2v~-~. 
We can also show, by an argument paralleling the previous one step- 
by-step that player I can guarantee himself a payoff of 1/2 + 
1/2[~¢/a + 1] by adopting the following mixed strategy; let d~(y) be a 
single-threshold decision function defined by 
d/y )  =0,  y < ~, 
=1,  y_>~. 
Each such decision function corresponds toa pure strategy which we call 
(as before). Consider the [~/a + 1] pure strategies {Sn}, n = 
- [V~], - [W/a] +2, -[W/a] + 4, . . . ,  [W/a]. The mixed strategy for 
player I which guarantees the stated payoff is to choose the/3, randomly 
with equal probability weighting. The results here are much as in the 
first example, of course, the essential difference being that making use 
of the rf phase allows the communicators to work against voltage noise- 
to-signal ratio instead of power noise-to-signM ratio. 
V. INFORMATION RATE 
Since, for even a moderately large noise-to-signal r tio, the probability 
of error per symbol in the systems we have described is large, it would, 
of course, be necessary to code the messages into the systems with codes 
using a great deal of redundancy. One must pay the price of a lower 
information rate in order to gain the relative invulnerability against all 
kinds of noise. It is of interest then to calculate the information rates in 
the sense of Shannon and see how they depend on the various param- 
eters. 
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A. KEYED CARRIER SYSTEM 
Since the over-all system constitutes a symmetric binary channel, the 
information rate per symbol duration is 
r = 1 Jr (1 - p) log(1 - p) + p logp  
where r is the rate, p is the probability of a correct choice for each sym- 
bol, and the log is to the base 2. We have from Section II, 
1 1 
P = ~+2[a  + 1~] 
but for the rate calculations we shall use the approximate value, 
1 1 
P~-~2 + 2-~" 
We want to fred the rate per second, R, rather than the rate per symbol 
duration, T, so it is necessary to relate the required symbol duration to 
other parameters. Let us assume that T is inversely proportional to the 
bandwidth, B, of the receiver--this constraint is plausible because for 
a fixed level of performance, the ringing time of the receiver predetection 
filter should be kept in constant ratio with the symbol duration T. 
Thus, we have 
T___ p B'  o = constant. 
Now we consider two cases: 
1. The maximum possible noise power density is constant over the 
whole frequency spectrum and is equal to N watts/cycle. The signal 
power is fixed at S watts. Then 
NBT NB 
a - -  
ST S"  
2. The maximum possible noise power and the signal power are both 
independent of bandwidth, so a = constant. 
For case 1 we have: 
.t(. s.)+ (. + (. 2p 
NB>I .  
S = 
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For large bandwidth, NB/S large, this gives, by expanding the loga- 
rithms: 
+ o 
where O(1/B ~) is a quantity such that B~O(1/B 2) is bounded as B --~ ~o. 
Thus, the information rate goes to zero linearly with the bandwidth for 
fixed signal power, which is not surprising since the noise-to-signal ratio 
goes to infinity. However, one notices that the signal-to-noise power 
per cycle ratio enters as the square, whereas the bandwidth enters 
linearly. 
For case 2 we have: 
R - - - -B{(1 - -1 )  log (1 - -1 )4 -  (1 4- 1) log (14-  1)} a_-__ 1 
and for large a (noise-to-signal ratio) 
6)1 R=~L 4-0 
These two cases presumably set limits on the sort of noise behavior one 
might encounter in practice. It may be noted in passing that it is pos- 
sible to let the noise energy grow with bandwidth in such fashion that 
as B --* ~, the noise-to-signal ratio and the information rate both 
become infinite. 
B. CORRELATION DETECTION SYSTEM 
Again, in this example, the channel is symmetric and binary, so the 
information rate per symbol is, as before: 
r = 1 4- (1 -- p) log(1 -- p) 4- (1 4- p) log(1 4- p). 
The probability of making a correct decision per symbol is now 
1 1 
P = ~ 4- 2 [v~ + 1] • 
Thus, we need only replace a by ~¢/a in the expressions of the preceding 
paragraph to obtain the information rates for the phase reversal system 
with correlation detection. Under the same assumptions as in case 1 
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above,  
B log -- 
( q- 1 q- log 1 q- // NB___> 1. 
For large band\~ddth (sinai1 ,S/NB) 
4p ~ " 
Thus, for large bandwidth, under the assumption of constant potential 
noise power per cycle, the rate does not much depend on the bandwidth, 
but is nearly proportional to the signal-power-to-noise-power-per-cyde 
ratio. It is interesting to compare this with the well-known result of 
Shannon's, {hat. for a channel with additive white noise and limited 
average power the channel capacity is ~symptotioally proportional to 
the signal-to-noise ratio, S/N.  
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